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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 54 JUNE 1956 No. 8 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED 
THE SEGREGATION QUESTION 
Alfred H. Kelly• 
SOME sixty years ago in Plessy v. Ferguson/ the Supreme Court of the United States adopted the now celebrated "separate 
but equal" doctrine as a constitutional guidepost for state segrega-
tion statutes. Justice Brown's opinion declared that state statutes 
imposing racial segregation did not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, provided only that the statute in question guaranteed equal 
facilities for the two races. Brown's argument rested on a historical 
theory of the intent, although he offered no evidence to support it. 
"The object of the amendment," he said, "was undoubtedly to 
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but 
in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish 
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished 
from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon 
terms unsatisfactory to either."2 
Justice Harlan alone attacked the majority's historical inter-
pretation. The intent of the amendment, he insisted, was to "pro-
tect all the civil rights that pertain to freedom and citizenship," so 
that "in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is 
. . . no superior, dominant ruling class of citizens" and "Our 
Constitution is color-blind."3 So did the former slaveholder and 
opponent of abolition speak to the revolutionary intent of the 
amendment: its purpose had been, he thought, to destroy all caste 
and racial class legislation in the United States.4 
• Ph.B. 1931, A.M. 1934, Ph.D. 1938, University of Chicago; Professor of History and 
Chairman of the Department of History, Wayne University; co-author (with W. A. Harbi-
son} of The American Constitution: Its Origins arid Development (1948, 1955). The author 
was responsible in large part for the historical research embodied in the appellants' brief 
on reargument of the school segregation cases prior to the decision of May 17, 1954.-Ed. 
1163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896). 
2Id. at 544. 
3Id. at 555. 
4 Harlan had clearly anticipated his Plessy position in his dissent in the Civil Rights 
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Whose history was correct, Brown's or Harlan's? Did the 
framers of the amendment intend to guarantee only certain Negro 
rights but preserve at the same time the legal base of the caste 
system in the several states, or did they intend to destroy entirely 
the constitutional foundation for all caste and racial class legisla-
tion under state law? In the context of our own day, did the 
framers intend to strike down "separate but equal" school legisla-
tion, Jim Crow laws, and the like, or did they not? 
To be sure, the Supreme Court of late years has exhibited a 
decided tendency to consign Justice Brown's theory of intent to 
the limbo of dead and forgotten constitutional doctrines. In the 
School Segregation Cases,° the Court raised the question of intent 
for reargument, but then cast the historical question aside as one 
impossible of solution and decided the cases instead upon a socio-
logical theory of the meaning of equality in the twentieth century.6 
Thus the Court burie_d Brown's theory without formally refuting 
it. But for the constitutional historian the question still has vast 
meaning: who was right, Brown or Harlan? 
Historical problems seldom have the grace to resolve them-
selves precisely in terms of the issues which emerge a _hundred 
or a thousand years later. The "separate but equal" controversy 
is no exception. The phrase "separate but equal" appears nowhere 
in the debates on the amendment, nor so far as I know in the 
popular discussions outside Congress or in the state legislatures. 
But this does not imply that the Brown-Harlan dispute is histori-
cally meaningless. "Separate but equal" legislation is caste legis-
lation; it is statutory classification by race. Did the framers intend 
to destroy state racial class legislation and classification by race, 
or did they not? 
Any examination of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment must begin by taking account of the important historical 
scholarship of Graham, tenBroek, and others, who have established 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 at 26, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883), where he defended the constitutionality of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. L. 335. This statute, among other things, guaranteed the 
"full and equal enjoyment" by all persons without regard to race-of the facilities of inns, 
public conveyances, and the like. Harlan had asserted that the rights in question were 
"legal, not social rights" and properly fell within the purview of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. "The supreme law of the land," he had added, now provided that "no authority 
shall be exercised in this country upon the basis of discrimination • • • because of • • • 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3· at 59, 62, 
3 S.Ct. 18 (1883). 
5 Brown v. Board of Education, of Topeka, 345 U.S. 972, 73 S.Ct. 1114 (1953). 
6 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954). 
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quite conclusively that the Fourteenth Amendment both in general 
ideology and legal phrase was a product of radical pre-war anti-
slavery theory.7 The antislavery idealists of the generation after 
1830 were thoroughly convinced that the institution of slavery 
violated profoundly the premises of the Declaration of Independ-
ence, the doctrine of natural law and natural rights, and the 
"higher law" origins of all constitutional government. Orthodox 
constitutional theory as exemplified by Marshall, Taney, Story, 
Kent, and Webster, however, provided them with only limited 
means for a direct constitutional assault upon the institution of 
slavery, which stood safely within the protective folds of a federal 
constitutional system and limited national sovereignty. But the 
more radical antislavery idealists, with a fine disregard for orthodox 
constitutional law, proceeded to evolve a constitutional doctrine 
of their own, which if carried into practice ,vould dispose decisively 
of the problem of slavery. The Fourteenth Amendment ultimately 
was a product of their theorizing. 
The fundamental constitutional concept of the radical anti-
slavery theorists was the doctrine of national citizenship, to which 
in turn were presumed to be attached a comprehensive body of 
natural rights and civil liberties. The doctrine of national citizen-
ship was expounded by W.W. Ellsworth and Calvin Goddard as 
early as 1834 when they contended that the comity clause in 
Article IV guaranteeing the privileges and immunities of citizens 
in the several states actually conferred a national citizenship upon 
all Americans, white and Negro.8 Happily enough for the anti-
slavery idealists, Justice Bushrod Washington in a federal circuit 
court case had set forth in some detail a long list of civil liberties 
guaranteed by this clause as a matter of interstate comity.9 For the 
antislavery idealist, the comity clause accordingly became there-
after a national bill of rights translating into positive law the in-
junctions of higher law doctrine. 
Significantly, the immediate constitutional right most often 
invoked by antislavery theorists was that of "the equal protection 
7Graham, "The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment," 1950 
WIS. L. REV. 479, 610; TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND• 
MENT (1951). 
8 Crandall v. Connecticut, 10 Conn. 339 at 348 (1836). 
9 Corfield v. Coryell, (C.C. Pa. 1823) 6 Fed. Cas. 546 at 551-552, No. 3230. This case, 
insignificant as it appears, is in reality of vast importance in determining the intent of the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. They repeatedly cited Justice Washington's dictum 
on the meaning of "privileges and immunities" during the debates on the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 and on the amendment itself. 
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of the laws," an idea that occurred again and again in antislavery 
literature.10 "Equal protection" had virtually no antecedent legal 
history; instead it grew out of the antislavery radicals' humanitarian 
emphasis upon absolute human equality according to their read-
ing of the Declaration of Independence. Henry B. Stanton and 
Charles Olcott introduced the thought to abolitionist propaganda 
in the 1830's,11 and Charles Sumner translated it into constitutional 
doctrine in the Roberts case,12 where he derived the guarantee from 
the provision in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 that "All 
men are born free and equal. ... "13 In the late 1850's, John A. 
Bingham of Ohio, the future principal author of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, repeatedly expounded the idea in debate on the floor 
of the House of Representatives. In a speech on the floor of the 
House of Representatives in January 1857, for example, he 
declared, "It must be apparent that the absolute equality of all, and 
the equal protection of each, are principles of our Constitution 
... " as "universal and indestructible~ the human race."14 
In the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and in similar 
provisions in the bills of rights of the several state constitutions 
the abolitionists found another legal weapon which they proceeded 
to shape to their own interests. It is common legal knowledge that 
"ciue process of law" as it came down through centuries of English 
and early American usage, had a purely procedural content; put 
simply, it meant justice in a criminal trial or civil case.15 How-
ever, long before the courts in Wynehamer v. New York16 and Dred 
10 Frank and Munro, "The Original Understanding of 'Equal Protection of the Laws,'" 
50 COI.. L. R.Ev. 131 (1950); TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 96 et seq. (1951). 
11 REMARKS OF HENRY B. STANTON IN THE REPRESENTATIVE HALL ••• BEFORE THE COM• 
MITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETIS (1837); AMERICAN ANTI-
SLAVERY SOCIETY, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 68 n. (1839); OLCOTT, LEcTuRE5 ON SLAVERY AND 
ABOLITION 18 (1838). 
12 Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 (1850). 
13 MASS. CONST., art. I, Part First (1780). _ 
14 CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d sess., appendix, 140 (1857). 
15 The doctrine of vested rights with its restrictive substantive implications had 
already received specific recognition as early as the Federalist period, but before 1850 the 
courts rested it almost entirely upon the contracts clause or upon the fundamental nature 
of all constitutional government. WRIGHT, THJt CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1938). On the early meaning of due process, see Corwin, "The Doctrine of Due Process 
of Law before the Civil War," 24 HARv. L. REv 366, 460 (1911), reprinted in l SELECTED 
EssAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 203 (1938); Grant, "The Natural Law Background of Due 
Process," 31 CoL.·L. REv. 56 (1931); Howe, "The Meaning of 'Due Process of Law' Prior 
to the Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment," 18 CALIF. L. REv. 583 (1930). 
1613 N.Y. 378 (1856), where the court applied substantive due process to invalidate 
the state prohibition law. 
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Scott v. Sandford11 were to give due process a substantive content, 
the antagonists in the slavery controversy had seized upon the clause 
in the Fifth Amendment and endowed it with a substantive mean-
ing to suit their respective propaganda purposes. 
In 1836, the so-called Pinckney Report in the House of Repre-
sentatives set forth the contention that due process acted as a sub-
stantive limitation upon the power of Congress to interfere with 
property in slaves in the District of Columbia.18 Here was a sub-
stantive reading of the Fifth Amendment coupling it to the doctrine 
of vested rights which directly anticipated Taney's· similar resort 
to the clause in his Dred Scott opinion nearly a generation later. 
Meanwhile, the enemies of slavery were engaged in formulating 
their doctrines of a substantive due process. In 1836 the Ohio 
abolitionist faction led by Theodore Dwight Weld and James G. 
Birney launched an attack upon the state's so-called Black Laws of 
1807.19 These statutes virtually prohibited Negro migration into 
the state,. banned Negroes from certain occupations, denied them 
the right to "be sworn or give evidence" in cases in which whites 
were parties, and excluded colored and mulatto children from the 
common schools. A report adopted at the Ohio Anti-Slavery Con-
vention of 1835 first appealed to the familiar language and philoso-
phy of the Declaration that "ALL men are born free and independ-
ent, and have certain natural inherent unalienable rights, among 
which are the enjoying and defending of life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and attaining 
happiness . .. ,"20 and then blasted the obnoxious code as a viola-
tion of the due process clause of the state constitution.21 
Thereafter, resort to due process as a guarantee incompatible 
with the institution of slavery or a hierarchical caste society was a 
common stock-in-trade of the antislavery radicals.22 The argument 
that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment rightfully made 
slavery unlawful in all the western territories appeared in the Free 
Soil Party platforms of 1848 and 1852, and in the Republican Party 
platforms of 1856 and 1860.23 And when Bingham took up the 
17 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857). 
18 H. Rep. 691, 24th Cong., 1st sess. (1836). 
19 5 Ohio Laws, c. 8, p. 53 (1807). 
20 Proceedings of the Ohio Anti-Slavery Convention held at Putnam, 37 (1835). 
21 Id. at 37-40. 
22 Graham, "Procedure to Substance-Extra-Judicial Rise of Due Process, 1830-1860," 
40 CAuF. L. REv. 483 (1953). 
23 The Free Soil Party Platfonns are reprinted in 1 STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE 
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cudgels in Congress as an enemy of slavery it was to the due process 
clause that he turned for support in his attack on slavery in the 
territories and for specific justification for the doctrine of equal 
protection of the laws as inherent in the Federal Constitution.24 
It is clear enough, then, that the pre-war antislavery radicals 
fixed the immediate content of the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It was they who promoted the idea of a primary 
national citizenship which included Negroes, and who attempted 
to clothe such citizenship with privilege and immunities, due proc-
ess, and equal protection, whereby they sought to establish com-
plete equality before the law for whites and Negroes alike. · As of 
1860, these doctrines were outside the pale of constitutional ortho-
doxy, but the political upheaval incident to the Civil War put a 
group of old antislavery enthusiasts in a position to control the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress and to write their radical reformism into 
the Constitution itself. The debates on the passage of the amend-
ment reveal clearly enough how completely the constitutional 
ideology of the pre-war antislavery movement shaped the objectives 
of the Radical Republicans. There is nothing very surprising in 
all this, for the principal authors of the amendment as well as 
numbers of other Radicals had themselves been associated with the 
pre-war antislavery movement. John A. Bingham, principal 
author of the first section of the amendment, had been a leading 
congressional antislavery constitutional theorist. 
However, a critical question remains: did the pre-war anti-
slavery idealists conceive of equality before the law as enjoining 
PRESIDENCY FROM 1788 to 1897, 239-241 and 253-256 (1928). The 1848 platform observed 
that "our fathers •.• expressly denied to the federal government ••• all constitutional 
power to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due legal process" and 
concluded as a consequence, "In the judgment of this convention, Congress has no more 
power to make a slave than to make a king" and "it is the duty of the federal govern-
ment to relieve itself from all responsibility for the existence or continuance of slavery 
wherever the government possesses constitutional authority to legislate on that subject ...• " 
The 1852 platform was substantially identical. The Republican platform of 1856 declared 
that "as our republican fathers ••• ordained that no person should be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law, it becomes our duty to maintain this 
provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it for the purpose of estab-
lishing slavery in any territory of the United States .••. " Again, the 1860 plank was sub-
stantially the same. Id. at 271, 291. 
24 In his January 1857 speech, Bingham argued that the due process clause in the 
Fifth Amendment required Congress to enforce the "republican principle of absolute 
equality," in the western territories, and that under the due process clause Congress could 
permit "neither slave statutes nor slave constitutions" in the western territories. CONG, 
GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d sess., 140 (1857). See also Bingham's speech incorporating the same 
argument in CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d sess., 981-985 (1859). 
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all class legislation based upon race? If so, the way is opened for 
some plausibility for the argument that they carried this notion in-
to the post-war era and that some of them saw it as implicit in the 
language of the amendment they drafted. 
The answer is that the constitutional opponents of slavery were 
for the most part heavily preoccupied with the overwhelming curse 
of slavery itself, but that on occasion they did indeed extend their 
attack to all legalized class distinctions based upon race. The 
Weld-Birney attack upon the Ohio "Black Laws," with their school 
segregation provisions, has already been observed.25 Animosity to 
racial segregation laws long remained a cardinal doctrine of Ohio 
enemies of slavery. In 1847, ,for example, an antislavery conven-
tion at Macedon resolved that "all monopolies, class legislation, and 
exclusive privileges are unequal, unjust, morally wrong, and sub-
versive of the ends of civil government."26 
In Massachusetts, the abolitionists staged a long and successful 
legislative and judicial assault upon all class legislation by race. 
In 1843, they secured repeal of the state miscegenation statute, 
and they next won passage of a statute prohibiting "Jim Crow" 
cars.27 They followed these victories with a concerted attack upon 
segregated schools, which existed on a local option basis without 
benefit of specific state sanction in Boston and a number of smaller 
towns. Salem, Lowell, New Bedford and Nantucket presently 
abolished segregated schools under abolitionist pressure.28 
In 1846, Wendell Phillips and his abolitionist fellows launched 
a bitter assault upon the long established segregated Negro primary 
school in Boston. However, the conservative majority on the 
Boston School Committee refused their petition, defending segre-
gated schools not only as "legal and just but best adapted to pro-
mote the education of that class of our population," a position 
which The Liberator denounced as based on "flimsy yet venomous 
sophistries."29 When three years of public pressure failed, the anti-
slavery enthusiasts in 1849 attacked the constitutionality of Boston 
school segregation in the courts, retaining Charles Sumner as 
25 Notes 19, 20, 21 supra. 
26 Macedon Convention, Platform (1847). The platform also declared that "no civil 
government can either authorize or permit one individual or class of men to infringe the 
natural and equal rights of another individual or class of men ...• " 
27 MASSACHUSETTS ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT 5-7 (1844). 
28 Levy and Phillips, "The Roberts Case: Source of the 'Separate but Equal' Doctrine," 
56 AM. HIST. REv. 510 (1951). 
29 THE LIBERATOR, August 21, 1846. 
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counsel to argue their case before the Massachusetts Supreme 
· Court.80 
Sumner's argument in the resulting Roberts case stands even 
today as the classic argument for the incompatibility of "equal 
protection of the laws" and state-sanctioned caste institutions. 
Asserting that his animating principle of equal protection was 
derived properly from the language of the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion of 1780 declaring that "all men are born free and equal,"31 
he asserted that segregated schools violated equal protection and 
the state constitution by imposing inconvenience upon Negro 
children and "by establishing a system of Caste [as] odious as that 
of the Hindoos." Cleverly anticipating a "separate but equal" 
dictum from the court, he argued that "the separate school is not 
an equivalent" for mixed schools, since it "brand[ s] a whole race 
with the stigma of infei:iority and degredation" in violation of "the 
equality of all men before the law."82 Sumner lost his case, and 
Chief Justice Shaw's opinion today is remembered principally as 
the source pf the separate but equal doctrine.33 But the case re-
mains powerful evidence of the fact that certain radical antislavery 
idealists regarded legalized segregation as incompatible with con-
stitutional government and equal protection. 
The Roberts case does not stand alone; on the contrary, there 
are numerous indications in the courts of the northern states be-
tween 1840 and 1860 that antislavery idealists were backing judicial 
assault upon segregated schools. In Van Camp v. Board of Educa-
tion,84 for example, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected an abolition-
ist attempt to break down a literal interpretation of the state school 
segregation statute of 1853, which specifically required separate 
white and Negro schools. The majority justices would not listen 
to the argument, holding that the law's intent was clear and un-
ao Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 (1850). 
81MAss. CoNsr., art. I, Part First (1780). 
82 Sumner's complete argument is reprinted in .3 CHARLES SUMNER: His CoMPLETE 
WORKS 51-100 (1900). 
83 Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 (1850). 
84 9 Ohio 407 (1859). The Van Camp case was the latest of a long series of school 
segregation cases in Ohio before the Civil War. The Ohio Supreme Court for a long time 
followed a "pro-Negro" interpretation of the law, allowing suits to admit mulatto children 
to the public schools. Williams v. School District, Wright (Ohio) 578 (1834), and 
Lane v. Baker, 12 Ohio 237 (1843). In the Van Camp case, the court admitted that earlier 
decisions had in effect admitted colored children to the public schools, but held that the 
1853 law had been enacted specifically to remedy judicial evasion of the earlier statutes. 
In 1859, there was a hot political fight in San Francisco over the admission of Negroes 
to the public schools. See Al>THEKER, A DOCUMENTARY HlsrORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN 
THE UNITED STATFS 416-418 (1951). 
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mistakable and that it was not unconstitutional, in that it was "one 
of classification and not exclusion." But Justice Sutliff, dissenting, 
attacked the majority decision as a violation of the rights of man 
and proclaimed instead that ". . . caste legislation . . . is in-
consistent with the theory and spirit of a free . . . government. "35 
Another question now presents itself: did the post-war authors 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, who drew their constitutional doc-
trine from the old antislavery movement, also conceive of their 
constitutional ideas as reflecting the pre-war antislavery animus 
against caste and class legislation? 
Any attempt to answer this question must begin with an analysis 
of the debates on the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.36 
For it was in those debates that the Radical ideas as to how far 
federal guarantees of civil rights as against state action might prop-
erly extend, both by legislation and by constitutional amendment, 
were first clearly set down. The debates on the Civil Rights Act 
are also important because they reveal very clearly a direct linkage 
between the ideas of the Radical Republican majority in the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress, and because the Civil Rights Act bore an 
extremely close relationship to the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself. 
A major consideration in the confused situation facing the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress in December 1865 was the constitutional 
and legal status of the Negro. The Radical Republican bloc 
which was presently to take control of Congress and the process 
of Reconstruction itself was not yet coherent or strong enough 
to assert itself entirely; instead, for the moment the Radicals merely 
blocked the seating of delegates from the Johnson governments 
in the South, and ·then set up the Joint Committee of Fifteen, 
composed of nine representatives and six senators, to study the 
entire question of reconstruction and the Negro.37 It was this 
committee which after several months of labor was to report the 
text of the Fourteenth Amendment to the floor of Congress. Sig-
nificantly, the Joint Committee was firmly under the control of 
the Republican Radicals, several of whom, including John A. 
Bingham and Thaddeus Stevens, had been prominently associated 
with the radical pre-war antislavery movement.88 
85 Van Camp v. Board of Education, 9 Ohio 407 at 416 (1859). 
8614 Stat. L. 27 (1866). 
37 CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess. 3-24 (1866). [This volume of the Globe is herein-
after cited as "Globe."] 
38 KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMIIII"ITEE OF FIFTEEN ON REcoNSTRUGnON 
37.ff. (1914). Committee members included Representatives Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsyl-
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However, the Radicals were not willing to await the committee 
report before moving to protect the Negro. In particular, they 
were vastly alarmed by the so-called "Black Codes" then being 
enacted by the Johnson government legislatures. From a tech-
nical point of view, the Black Codes implied that the newly eman-
cipated Negro occupied the status of an inferior non-citizen class, 
a sort of modern helot, with legal rights vastly inferior to those of 
the white mari.39 Significantly, several of the codes incorporated 
segregation provisions.4.0 The Radicals soon made it clear in debate 
that they were determined to destroy the ·Black Codes and to guar-
antee the Negro instead full citizenship and a concomitant body 
of civil rights. 
The difficulty was that the exact constitutional status of the 
Negro was a matter of great uncertainty. It was not at all clear 
whether any such thing as national citizenship existed; if it did 
exist, it was not clear whether Negroes were or could be citizens of 
the United States. Many of the more Radical Republicans, Charles 
Sumner among them, still maintained the old antislavery faith: 
that national citizenship existed by virtue of the old Constitution 
and that Negroes were citizens of the United States clothed with a 
vania, Co-chairman, Elihu Washbume of Illinois, Justin Morrill of Vermont, Henry Grider 
of Kentucky, Roscoe Conkling of New York, John A. Bingham of Ohio, George Boutwell 
of Massachusetts, Henry T. Blow of Missouri, and Andrew J. Rogers of New Jersey. Senate 
members were William P. Fessenden of Maine, Co-Chairman, James W. Grimes of Iowa, 
Ira Harris of New York, Jacob Howard of Michigan, Reverdy Johnson of Maryland and 
George H. Williams of Oregon. All but Grider, Rogers and Johnson were Republicans; 
Stevens, Bingham, Conkling, Blow, and Morrill, were old Free Soil Whigs, as were Fes-
senden and Howard, while Williams, a former Democrat, was now an extreme Radical 
Republican. Stevens and Bingham, more than the others the actual authors of the forth-
coming amendment, had been prominent in the pre-war radi?11 antislavery movement. 
89 Several of the codes are abstracted in Senate Doc. No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d sess., 170-230 
(1866); others are in l FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HlsTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 273-312, 
(1906). Most of the codes contained labor contract provisions similar to those later out-
lawed by the Supreme Court as peonage agreements in violation of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. 
40 The Alabama and Mississippi codes prohibited miscegenation; Arkansas banned 
Negroes from the public schools, "except such schools as may be established exclusively for 
colored persons;" the Florida law set up a separately managed and separately taxed school 
system for Negroes; the Texas Constitution of 1866 carried a similar provision; the Mis-
sissippi statutes forbade Negroes to ride in any car set aside for white persons, and pro-
hibited "unlawful assembly" of whites and Negroes. 
Carl Schurz' report to President Johnson and Charles Sumner on conditions in the 
South strengthened the Radical conviction that the Black Codes were intended to thrust 
servile status upon the Negro. Senate Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st sess. (1865); also 1 BAN-
CROFT, ed., SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF CARL ScHtJRZ 279-374 (1913). 
Schurz mentioned the hostility in the South to Negro education and to Negro schools, and 
remarked among other things that "the free colored element of Louisiana ... pays a not 
inconsiderable proportion of the taxes, and contributes at the same time for the support 
of schools for whites, from which their children are excluded." 
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full body of civil rights. They insisted, indeed, that the Thirteenth 
Amendment was merely "declaratory" in that both freedom and 
citizenship were already inherent in the old Constitution.41 Others, 
among them Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania and Lyman Trum-
bull of Illinois, thought the amendment had made Negroes citizens 
and endowed them with full constitutional rights.42 Still others 
were even more cautious; they admitted that emancipation did 
not necessarily make the Negro a citizen, but they argued that the 
amendment had paved the way for Congress to exercise its power 
under the naturalization clause in Article I, section 8, and so be-
stow full citizenship upon the Negro. 
The more Radical Republicans also believed that al.I persons, 
white and Negro, were already clothed with a full body of civil 
rights as a necessary incident of national citizenship. This was the 
significance of the repeated references in debate on the Civil Rights 
bill to Justice Washington's opinion in the Garfield case,43 where 
the rights incident to citizenship had been described in all-inclusive 
terms under the comity clause. It followed, they argued, that Con-
gress already possessed comprehensive power to guarantee all civil 
rights whatsoever. More moderate Republicans, however, be-
lieved that Congress constitutionally could guarantee only those 
rights which were properly incident of the freedom guaranteed by 
the Thirteenth Amendment, and that a further amendment would 
be necessary to enable Congress to put all civil rights under federal 
guarantee. After some initial confusion, this was to be the position 
assumed both by Lyman Trumbull, author of the measure which 
became the Civil Rights Act of 186644 and by John A. Bingham, 
principal author of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Needless to say, nearly all Democrats and a few conservative 
Republicans looked upon these ideas as anathema. They conceded 
the Negro's freedom by virtue of the Thirteenth Amendment, but 
they denied that the Negro could be a citizen, distinguishing 
sharply between full citizenship and the status of a mere inhabitant 
without full membership in the body politic. Moreover, they 
41 Sumner had argued during debates on the amendment that slavery was so repugnant 
to the Constitution that Congress could destroy it by a simple statute. CONG. GLOBE, 38th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1479ff. (1864). James Ashley of Ohio in January 1865 argued that both 
whites and Negroes, free and slave, already had citizenship by virtue of the comity clause. 
Id. at 1199ff. Senator Ben Wade of Ohio took the same position. Id. at 2768. 
42 Stevens, contrary to Sumner and Ashley, argued that the Thirteenth Amendment had 
had a revolutionary effect on the constitutional system, and was not merely declaratory. 
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d sess., 265-266 (1865). 
43 Corfield v. Coryell, (C.C. Pa. 1823) 6 Fed. Cas. 546, No. 3230. 
4414 Stat. L. 27 (1866). 
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denied the very doctrine of national citizenship itself, in spite of 
the dictum of the Dred Scott case;45 as a corollary, they denied also 
that the Congress could legislate to make citizens, either by virtue 
of the original Constitution, the Thirteenth Amendment or the 
naturalization clause, foreign immigrants excepted. For them the 
Negro was still an inferior non-citizen whose rights were a matter 
of the sovereign discretion of the several states. Indeed, all civil 
rights lay within the reserved powers of the states, and Congress 
was without power to legislate for the protection of civil rights, 
either for whites or Negroes. 
The introduction of a number of civil rights bills by the 
Radicals soon brought divergent theories into sharp conflict. 
These measures marked out in bold relief the determination of the 
more enthusiastic Radicals to strike at the legal foundations of the 
entire caste system in the South, and indeed to work something of 
a revolution in the southern social order. With one important 
exception, all died early deaths and so were not subject to extended 
analysis in debate, so that it is not possible to state with any accuracy 
what their precise legal effect with respect to racial class legislation 
and segregation was intended to be, or what Congress would have 
thought of the matter had they been so analyzed. Indeed, their 
authors probably scarcely knew themselves, for at this stage the 
legal impact of a federal civil rights statute upon state racial class 
legislation simply had not been thought through carefully. 
Yet it is significant that all the bills introduced resorted to 
sweeping and all-inclusive prohibitory language and not mere 
enumeration alone.46 The mood of the Radicals was not one of 
45Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857). 
46 Worthy of some notice are Senate Bill 9, GLOBE 39, a temporary war measure intro• 
duced by Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, and the civil rights sections in Senate 
Bill 60, GLOBE 318, to extend the powers of the Freedmen's Bureau, introduced by Senator 
Lyman Trumbull of Illinois. Wilson's bill, which was intended as a war measure applying 
only to the seceded states would have declared null and void all laws in those states which 
recognized "any inequality of civil rights and immunities" based on any distinction of 
race, color or previous cond!tion of servitude. Speaking in defense of his measure, Wilson 
said that "we must see to it that the man made free by the Constitution .•. is a free• 
man indeed • • • that he can sue and be sued; that he can lease and buy and sell and own 
property, real and personal; that he go into the schools and educate himself and his chil• 
dren; that the rights . • • of the good old common law are his, and that he walks the 
earth •.. protected by the just and equal laws of his country." GLOBE Ill. Sumner in 
praising Wilson's bill, compared its probable effect to the Czar's proclamation of 1861 
ending serfdom in Russia, which among other things, he said, had guaranteed "equality ·at 
schools and in education." He added, "I trust that this example is none the less worthy 
of imitation because it is that of an empire .••• " GLOBE 91. Sumner's opposition to segre• 
gated schools was of course far more clear and decisive than that of his other colleagues. 
Trumbull's bill to extend the powers of the Freedmen's Bureau guaranteed Negroes 
"all civil rights and immunities belonging to white persons," and "the full and equal benefit 
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caution and restraint; on the contrary it was "revolutionary" in the 
sense that they were not afraid to project changes in the southern 
social order going far beyond the mere destruction of slavery. 
Moreover, they were concerned remarkably little with the purely 
traditional conservative constitutional notions of the extent of 
federal power. This general "revolutionary" mood has long been 
recognized by historians.47 It is important to understand it, for 
both the Civil Rights Act of 186648 and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment were products of it. 
By far the most important civil rights bill introduced was Senate 
Bill 61, which Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, chairman of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, reported to the floor of the upper 
house on January 5, 1866.49 This measure, destined to become the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866,50 in its most important sections as amend-
ed provided: 
"All persons born in the United States, and not subject to 
any foreign Power, are hereby declared to be citizens of the 
United States, without distinction of color, and there shall be 
no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the in-
habitants of any State or Territory of the United States on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery; but 
the inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to any 
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall have the same right to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real ap.d personal prop-
erty, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of person and property, and shall be sub-
ject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none 
of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and estate." Section 6 of the bill 
empowered the bureau to acquire land for schools, although there was no suggestion that 
this was to involve mixed schools. The Freedmen's Bureau was already operating nearly 
a thousand Negro schools in the South, but it made no effort to make these mixed schools, 
although many enthusiastic northerners hoped that this would be the result. COULTER, 
THE SOU11I DURING REcoNSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 80-88 (1947); PEIRCE, THE FREEDMEN'S 
BUREAU: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 83 (1904). 
47 See, for example, BEALE, THE CRITICAL YEAR 51 ff. (1930); RANDALL, THE Civn. WAR 
AND REcoNSTRUCTION 718-730 (1937). Wendell Phillips in 1865 led a successful movement 
to prevent dissolution of the American Antislavery Society, on the ground that the mere 
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment would give "no assurance of full civil rights or 
equality" for the Negro. The Society, he insisted, must continue until racial lines were 
entirely obliterated. NYE, WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON 186-187 (1955). 
4814 Stat. L. 27 (1866). 
49 GLOBE 129. 
15014 Stat. L. 27 (1866). 
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· other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to 
the contrary notwithstanding."51 
As originally introduced, the measure did not specifically guaran-
tee citizenship, apparently because Trumbull took it for granted 
that Negroes were now citizens of the United States, but very 
shortly it was amended at Trumbull's instance to include the 
citizenship clause, apparently because not all the Radicals were 
certain that Negro citizenship was now self-evident.62 
In opening debate on his bill on January 29, Trumbull argued 
that the Thirteenth l~ . .mendment had made it both necessary and 
constitutional. National citizenship, he thought, existed by vir-
tue of the naturalization clause-here he agreed with Taney's 
Dred Scott53 opinion. The Thirteenth Amendment had endowed 
the Negro with citizenship as a necessary incident of freedom, and 
Congress now had both the power and duty to guarantee the 
rights incidental thereto. "[T]hey are entitled ... ," he said, 
". . . to the great fundamental rights belonging to free citizens, 
and we have a right to protect them in the enjoyment of them."64 
Trumbull then passed to an attack on the Black Codes, which, 
he asserted, "although they do not make a man an absolute slave, 
yet deprive him of the rights of a free man." The object of the 
present bill, he continued, was ". . . to destroy all these discrim-
inations, and to carry into effect the constitutional amendment."65 
Trumbull made it clear that his notion of the rights incidental 
to national citizenship was exceedingly comprehensive in charac-
ter and followed closely pre-war antislavery constitutional doctrine. 
"Then, sir, I take· it," he said, "that any statute which is not 
equal to all, and which deprives any citizen of the civil rights 
which are secured to other citizens, is an unjust ... badge of 
servitude which, by the Constitution, is prohibited."56 Citing the 
dictum of Garfield v. Coryell,57 he argued that the rights of national 
citizenship inclucled all "privileges and immunities which are in 
61 Id. at 474, 498. 
62 Id. at 474, 497, 498. , 
53 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857). 
54 GLOBE 475. There was evidently some inconsistency in Trumbull's position. In re-
sponse to a question by Senator Van Winkle of West Virginia, he asserted that Congress 
possessed complete discretionary power over citizenship for Negroes by virtue of the natu-
ralization clause, which implied that it might withhold citizenship from Negroes at its 
discretion. But he next insisted that Negroes already were full citizens by virtue of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Ibid. 
65 GLOBE 474. 
66 Ibid. 
57 (C.C. Pa. 1823) 6 Fed. Cas. 546, No. 3230. 
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their nature fundamental; which belong . . . to the citizens of 
all free Governments .... "58 In short, he nationalized the comity 
clause and turned it into a national bill of rights against the states, 
as the pre-war antislavery theorists had pretty generally done. 
The spirited debate that followed centered upon three highly 
controversial constitutional questions: first, whether national 
citizenship existed and whether Congress could constitutionally 
confer such citizenship upon anyone, particularly upon Negroes; 
second, whether Congress constitutionally could define and 
guarantee the civil rights of so-called national citizens; and third, 
. and most significant here, the scope of the civil rights which would 
be guaranteed by the present bill. 
Briefly, the Conservatives, led by Willard Saulsbury of Dela-
ware, Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, Garrett Davis of Kentucky, 
Thomas Hendricks of Indiana, Peter Van Winkle of West Vir-
ginia, and Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania, denied that national 
citizenship existed, denied that Congress could define or confer 
citizenship under the naturalization clause, denied that the 
Thirteenth Amendment had made the Negro either a national or 
a state citizen, denied that the amendment had endowed the Negro 
with any rights other than simple freedom, and insisted that any 
guarantee of civil rights was still entirely a matter of the sovereign 
discretion of the several states. The Radicals, led by Trumbull 
of Illinois, Lot Morrill and W. P. Fessenden of Maine, Henry 
Wilson of Massachusetts, Timothy Howe of Wisconsin and Jacob 
Howard of Michigan, insisted that national citizenship existed, 
that Congress could define and confer it, that the Negro was al-
ready a citizen, and that Congress could legitimately protect civil 
rights incident thereto. 
More significant here was the sharp controversy that developed 
over the question of the scope and inclusiveness of the guarantee of 
civil rights in the proposed bill. The Conservatives seized at once 
upon a broad and all-inclusive interpretation of the term "civil 
rights," which they insisted also was implicit in the language of 
the bill itself. They pointed to the clause stipulating that "there 
shall be no discrimination in civil rights and immunities . . . on 
account of race,"59 and argued strenuously that this provision 
would destroy all state statutes whatsoever which made race the 
basis of any kind of discrimination or classification. The con-
118 GLOBE 475, quoted Corfield v. Coryell, (C.C. Pa. 1823) 6 Fed. Cas. 546. 
119 GLOBE 129. 
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sequence would be, they insisted, that state laws forbidding racial 
intermarriage and providing for segregated schools, theatres, omni-
busses, and the like would be struck down, a result they regarded 
as monstrous. Senator Cowan, a conservative Republican, in par-
ticular, struck at the probable effect of the law on school segrega-
tion: 
"Now, as I understand the meaning and intent of this bill, 
it is that there shall be no discrimination made between the 
inhabitants of the several states of this Union, none in any 
way. In Pennsylvania, for the greater convenience of the 
people, and for the greater convenience, I may say, of both 
classes of the people, in certain districts the Legislature has 
provided schools for colored children, has discriminated as 
between the two classes of children. We put the African 
children in this school-house and the white children over in 
that school-house, and educate them there as we best can. Is 
this amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
abolishing slavery to break up that system which Pennsylvania 
has adopted for the education of her white and colored chil-
- dren? Are the school directors who carry out that law and 
who make this distinction between these classes of children to 
be punished for a violation of this statute of the United States? 
To me, it is monstrous."60 
Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, one of the best legal minds in the 
Senate, pointed out that a number of the states had laws prohibit-
ing marriage between the races; the "no discrimination" clause, 
he said, would make miscegenation clauses unconstitutional 
whether or not this was Trumbull's intent. Not at all, said Trum-
bull and Fessenden; the bill would leave the two races under the 
same prohibition against marrying outside their own race; there-
fore it did not discriminate. But Johnson refused to accept this 
plea and continued to insist that under the proposed law state mis-
cegenation statutes would be void.61 Garrett Davis of Kentucky 
observed that the criminal code of his own state drew a distinction 
between Negroes and whites in the punishment for rape of a 
white woman-for the former the punishment was death; for the 
latter a term of imprisonment. And he concluded: "Here the 
honorable senator in one short bill breaks down all the domestic 
60 Id. at 500. 
61 Id. at 505-507. 
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systems of law that prevail in all the States . . . except so far as 
those laws shall be entirely uniform in their application."62 
There were two possible answers to the Conservatives' inter-
pretation of the sweeping extent of the "no discrimination" clause. 
One was to admit the point and concede freely the revolutionary 
force of the bill, and some of the Radicals were inclined to adopt 
exactly this position. The reply tendered Davis by Senator Morrill 
was characteristic of this position: 
"The Senator from Kentucky tells us that the proposition 
is revolutionary, and he thinks that is an objection. I freely 
concede that it is revolutionary. I admit that this species of 
legislation is absolutely revolutionary. But are we not in the 
midst of revolution? Is the Senator from Kentucky utterly 
oblivious to the grand results of four years of war? . . . 
"I accept, then, what the Senator from Kentucky thinks so 
obnoxious. We are in the midst of revolution."63 
Another answer consisted in offering vague assurances that the 
bill would not violate states rights, without attempting to answer 
specifically precise questions about the scope of the bill or its im-
pact upon particular instances of racial class legislation. Thus, 
Senator Howard, attempting to reassure moderate Republicans 
showing some concern, observed, 
". . . I do not understand the bill which is now before us 
to contemplate anything else than this, that in respect to all 
civil rights . . . there is to be . . . no distinction between 
the white race and the black race. It is to secure to these 
men whom we have made free the ordinary rights of a freeman 
and nothing else. . . ." There is no invasion of the legitimate 
rights of the States."64 
The trouble with reassurance of this sort, however, was that it 
simply did not meet the Conservative charge as to the scope of 
civil rights involved. The Radicals doubtless realized this well 
enough, which was one reason why they continued to deal in 
generalities. It must be observed also, that the projected measure 
was so novel and the term "civil rights" itself so devoid of ante-
cedent legal history that a definition of very precise legal con-
sequences was a difficult or impossible matter. 
62 Id. at 598. 
63 Id. at 570. 
64 Id. at 504. 
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The Senate on February 2 passed the Trumbull bill, 33 to 12, 
with the "no discrimination" clau·se intact.65 It was clear, however, 
that the Conservatives' broad interpretation of this clause and of 
the bill generally had raised many doubts which would have to 
be resolved before the measure became law. 
The Trumbull bill now went to the House, where on March 
2 it was reported out on the floor by James Wilson of Iowa, Chair-
man of the House Judiciary Committee. Wilson's defense of the 
bill's constitutionality was substantially the same as that of Trum-
-bull, but on the question of the force and effect of the "no discrim-
ina~ion" clause he declared for a narrow interpretation of the meas-
ure in unequivocal terms: 
"This part of the bill [he said, in reference to the no dis-
crimination clause] will probably excite more opposition and 
elicit more discussion than any other; and yet to my mind it 
seems perfectly defensible. It provides for the equality of 
citizens of the United States in the enjoyment of civil rights 
and immunities. What do these terms mean? Do they mean 
that in all things civil, social, political, all citizens, without 
distinction of race or color, shall be equal? ... No ... : 
Nor do they mean that all citizens shall sit on the same juries, 
or that their children shall attend the same schools. These 
are not civil rights or immunities."66 
He then went on to assert vaguely that civil rights were only the 
"natural rights of man," while immunities, he said, merely secure 
to citizens of the United States equality in the exemptions of the 
law.67 
In other words, Wilson attempted to reassure the more moder-
ate Republicans and Conservatives by adopting a restrictive inter-
pretation of the "no discrimination" clause. But the Conserv-
atives in the House also refused to be reassured. Representative 
Rogers of New Jersey, a die-hard conservative Democrat and a 
member of the Joint Committee of Fifteen, replied to Wilson in 
a lengthy speech in which he argued, as had Johnson, Hendricks, 
and Davis in the Senate, that the "no discrimination" clause would 
break down all state statutes which classified on the basis of race. 
He cited once more the Kentucky statute for the unequal punish-
ment of rape, the anti-miscegenation acts, an Indiana statute for-
65 Id. at 606, 607. 
66 Id. at 1117. 
67 Ibid. 
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bidding Negroes to acquire real estate, and the Pennsylvania 
statute segregating white and Negro school children. Civil rights, 
he insisted, in fact included "all the rights that we enjoy." "What 
broader words than privileges and immunities," he inquired, "are 
to be found in the dictionary?"68 Representative Delano, of Ohio, 
another conservative, citing the old Ohio school segregation law, 
observed that the statute "did not, of course, place the black popula-
tion on an equal· footing with the whites, and would, therefore, 
under the terms of this bill be void. "69 Michael Kerr of Indiana, 
challenging the constitutionality of the bill under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, asked rhetorically whether it was slavery or involun-
tary servitude" ... to deny to children of free negroes or mulat-
toes . . • the privilege of attending the common schools of a State 
with the children of white men?"70 Representative Henry Ray-
mond, a moderate New York Republican and editor of the New 
York Times, warned that in his understanding the term "civil 
rights" covered the whole range of commonly understood liberties 
and immunities, and that he therefore entertained grave doubts as 
to the measure's constitutionality.71 
These arguments carried the day. On March 9, John A. Bing-
ham of Ohio, then a member of the Joint Committee on Recon-
struction which presently was to report the substance of the first 
section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Congress, rose in the 
House to demand that the "no discrimination" clause be struck 
out of the bill. Accepting the "broad" or Conservative interpreta-
tion of the "no discrimination" clause, Bingham argued that civil 
rights included the entire range of civil privileges and immunities 
within organized society, excepting only political rights, and then 
insisted that Congress had no power to enact such legislation merely 
by benefit of the constitutional powers it derived from the Thir-
teenth Amendment. The result of the present language, Bingham 
said, would be to strike down every state law that set up any kind 
of discrimination against Negroes: 
"If civil rights has this extent, what, then, is proposed by 
the provision of the first section? Simply to strike down by 
congressional enactment every State constitution which makes 
a discrimination on account of race or color in any of the civil 
rights of the citizen. I might say here, without the least fear 
68 Id. at 1122." 
69 Id., appendix at 158. 
70 Id. at 1268. 
71 Id. at 1267. 
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of contradicti~n, that there is scarcely a State in this Union 
which does not, by its constitution or its statute laws, make 
some discrimination on account of race or color between 
citizens of the United States in respect of civil rights."72 
Bingham then insisted that he believed that all discriminatory 
legislation ought to be wiped out. But the proper way to achieve 
this result, he thought, was "not by an arbitrary assumption of 
power, but by amending the Constitution of the United States, 
expressly prohibiting the States from any such abuse of power in 
the future. "73 
Wilson at first refused to accept Bingham's "broad interpreta-
tions," and tried to defend the language of the Trumbull bill as it 
stood: 
"The gentleman from Ohio tells the House that civil 
rights involve all the rights that citizens have under the 
72 Id. at 1291. Bingham had offered a motion the previous day to recommit the bill 
with instructions to strike out the "no discrimination" clause. Id. at 1266. 
73 Id. at 1291. The precise character of Bingham's argument has become a matter of 
some controversy. Bickel, in "The Original Understanding and Segregation Decision," 69 
HAR.v. L. REV. I (1955), argues that Bingham objected to the "no discrimination" clause 
as a matter of policy as well as a matter of constitutional law and that he was "endeavor-
ing merely to make the bill 'less offensive, less unjust.'" He does not think that Bingham 
implied that he would approve the "no discrimination" clause were the constitutional 
difficulty removed. He points out that Bingham's words, "I say with all my heart, that 
this should be the law of every State,'' and advocating a constitutional amendment in-
stead of "an arbitrary assumption of power" by Congress were spoken immediately after 
Bingham had quoted the enumerated guarantees of the bill, not the "no discrimination" 
clause. Thus he concludes that Bingham did not mean to lend ariy support in policy, even 
by constitutional amendment, for the "no discrimination" clause. 
To the present writer this seems a very doubtful reading of Bingham's position. It 
ignores his extensive extremist antislavery background as well as his position in Congress 
as one of the strong Radical Republicans; it ignores, also, the latitudinarian defense of 
the force and scope of his own constitutional amendment with respect to civil rights which 
Bingham had presented to the House a few days earlier. It ignores also the following words 
of Bingham later in the same speech: "Now what does this bill propose? To reform the 
whole civil and criminal code of every State government by declaring that there shall be 
no discrimination between citizens on account of race or color in civil rights or in the 
penalties prescribed by their laws. I humbly bow before the majesty of justice, as I bow 
before the majesty of that God whose attribute it is, and therefore declare there should 
be no such inequality or discrimination even in the penalties for crime; but what power 
have you to correct it? That is the question . • . whence do you derive power to cure it 
by congressional enactment?" GLOBE 1293. It appears probable that while Bingham en-
tertained grave doubts as to the bill's constitutionality, he had no objection to the dis-
crimination clause as a matter of policy, and on the contrary he looked forward to curing 
the constitutional difficulty by amendment. Frank and Munro, "The Original Understanding 
of 'Equal Protection of the Laws,' " 50 CoL. L. REv. 131 (1950) agrees with this conclusion, 
as do Graham, "Our 'Declaratory' Fourteenth Amendment,'' 7 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1954), and 
FLACK, THE .ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 35 (1908). The vital objection to 
Bickel's interpretation, which, if valid, destroys the argument that Bingham ever sought 
anything more than a restricted scope of civil rights for the Negro, is that it is contradicted 
by Bingham's entire career and by his latitudinarian position during the debates on the 
Fourteenth Amendment. ' 
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government; that in the term are embraced those rights which 
belong to a citizen of the United States as such: ... and 
that this bill is not intended merely to enforce equality of 
rights, so far as they relate to citizens of the United States, 
but invades the States to enforce equality of rights in respect 
to those things which properly and rightfully depend on State 
regulations and laws. . . . He knows, as every man knows, 
that this bill refers to those rights which belong to men as 
citizens of the United States and none other; and when he talks 
of setting aside the school laws and jury laws and franchise 
laws of the States by the bill now under consideration, he steps 
beyond what he must know to be the rule of construction 
which must apply here, and as the result of which this bill 
can only relate to matters within the control of Congress."74 
Here was a restrictive interpretation which actually anticipated 
the dual citizenship doctrine of the "privileges and immunities" 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughterhouse 
cases.75 And here again was a denial that the "no discrimination" 
clause would strike down state racial statutes classifying by race. 
After some maneuvering, Bingham carried the day. His amend-
ment to strike out the "no discrimination" clause was first voted 
down 113 to 37, but the bill was nonetheless returned to the 
Judiciary Committee for restudy.76 On March 13, Wilson himself, 
reporting the bill to the floor once more, moved to strike out the 
"no discrimination" clause on the grounds that the words in ques-
tion "might give warrant for a latitudinarian construction not in-
tended."77 The House immediately concurred unanimously and 
without debate-obviously Bingham's argument had ceased to be 
a matter of controversy. Immediately thereafter, the House passed 
the bill, 111 to 38.78 The Senate concurred in the Bingham amend-
ment,79 and the bill went to the President, to become law over 
Johnson's veto. 
It seems highly probable, then, that the Civil Rights Act, as 
finally passed, was not intended to ban state racial segregation and 
classification laws. The main force of the Conservatives' attack 
on the "no discrimination" clause was that it would indeed destroy 
74 GLOBE 1294. 
75 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873). 
76 GLOBE 1296. The motion to recommit carried 82 to 72, with Bingham and a con-
siderable number of the Republicam voting with the Democrats. 
77 GLOBE 1366. 
78 Id. at 1367. 
79 Id. at 1416. 
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all race classification laws. The supporters of the bill at first in-
sisted that this interpretation was erroneous, but when John A. 
Bingham dramatically defended the Conservative interpretation in 
the face of James Wilson's declaration of narrow intent, the House 
finally resolved the element of doubt by striking out the "no dis-
crimination" clause entirely. 
It must be observed, however, that some element of doubt 
remained as to the scope of the bill, even at the time. Several 
Conservatives, among them Rogers, Cowan, Davis and Grim.es, 
even in the hour of final passage, continued to insist that the bill 
would destroy all racial segregation laws. The phrase "the inhabi-
tants of every race . . . shall have the same right . . . to . . . full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
persons and property"80 still stood in the bill, and was susceptible 
of possible broad interpretation, although it had not been stressed 
during the debates on the measure. Garrett Davis, for example, 
in a speech following Johnson's veto, cited various state laws im-
posing segregation in churches, omnibusses, steamboats, railroads, 
and the ·like, and asserted, "All these discriminations in the entire 
society of the United States are established by ordinances, regula-
tions, and customs. This bill proposes to break down and sweep 
them away, and to consummate their destruction, and bring the 
two races upon the same great plane of perfect equality. . . .~'81 
Numerous newspapers in both the North and South also 
thought that the bill would destroy entirely segregation in schools, 
theatres, churches, and public vehicles.82 A number of suits were 
filed in the state and district federal courts in the next year or so 
attacking local segregation laws banning Negroes from omnibusses, 
theatres, and churches.83 However, President Johnson in his veto 
message did not adopt the broad interpretation of the bill. Assum-
ing instead that it protected merely those rights inherent in citizen-
ship and freedom, he argued merely that if Congress could con-
stitutionally go this far in the protection of civil rights, there was 
80 Id. at 474, 498. 
81 Id., appendix at 183. 
82 NEW YoRK HERALD, March 29, 1866; Id., April 10, 1866; CINCINNATl CoMMERCIAL, 
March 30, 1866; NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, April 16, 1866; Id., May 16, 1866. 
83 FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 49-54 (1908) gives a summary 
of cases. In United States v. Rhodes, (C.C. Ky. 1866) 27 Fed. Cas. 785, No. 16, 151, Justice 
Swayne held the Civil Rights Act constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment, but 
observed that the law also "gives only certain civil rights." Id. at 794 •. The case dealt with 
the right of a Negro to testify against whites in the Kentucky courts, a right Swayne 
affirmed under the Jaw. · 
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no logical reason why it could not make segregation and inter-
marriage a matter of congressional regulation.84 
A new question now occurs: what was the relationship of the 
Civil Rights Act to the Fourteenth Amendment itself? Was the 
first section of the amendment intended merely to remove doubt 
as to the constitutional status of the Civil Rights Act, or was it the 
intent of the framers of the amendment and of Congress to go 
beyond the restrictive and ~numerative scope of the Civil Rights 
Act, and to place all civil rights, in the Bingham sense, under the 
protection of the amendment? 
The evidence on this critical point is somewhat contradictory, 
but careful analysis appears to establish the following tentative 
conclusions: First, the principal Radical leaders concerned with 
the amendment, notably Bingham, Stevens, Morrill, Fessenden, 
and Howard, deliberately sought to go far beyond the guarantees 
of the Civil Rights Act and to place all civil rights, in the expansive 
Bingham definition, under federal guarantees of equality against 
state law. Second, for strategic political reasons, the first section 
of the amendment was in part, at least, represented on the floor 
of both houses as intended merely to constitutionalize the Civil 
Rights Act and to put its guarantees beyond assault by possible 
future conservative Congresses. Third, and perhaps most im-
portant, the very phrases used in the first section of the amendment 
were, by virtue of their history and derivation, somewhat vague 
and amorphous, and not subject to precise legal delineation in 
debate, and it was not altogether to the Radical interest to attempt 
such definition. 
The intent of certain Radical leaders to go beyond the restric-
tive enumeration of the Civil Rights Act and to incorporate a 
series of expansive guarantees in the Constitution is quite clear. 
In a general sense, the best evidence of this is the language of the 
guarantees which Bingham and the other authors of the Four-
teenth Amendment incorporated in the first section. The guar-
antees they finally adopted-privileges and immunities, due proc-
ess and equal protection-were not at all derived from the Civil 
Rights Act, which, with the exception of one vague phrase in its 
final form, had used the restrictive enumerative device. Instead, 
the authors derived their guarantees deliberately from the pre-war 
Radical antislavery movement. If we recall Bingham's prominent 
pre-war association with the formulation of these guarantees m 
84 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3065 (1913). 
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antislavery ideology, we may conclude reasonably enough that 
the resort to this language was no accident. 
Now it cannot be emphasized too strongly that these phrases, 
as used in the antislavery movement, had a radical expansive, 
humanitarian, equalitarian quality. As already observed, the pre-
war antislavery idealists had endowed due process of law with a 
substantive spirit (very different, indeed, from that which it had 
acquired in the Dred Scott and Wynehamer cases) which in effect 
made it a legislative injunction to maintain a casteless equalitarian 
social order. So, likewise, "privileges and immunities," derived 
from the comity clause of the old Constitution, had been seized 
upon, given the expansive content of Justice Washington's all-in-
clusive description in the Garfield case, and translated into a 
national Bill of Rights against state action. And as for equal 
protection-it was straight-out antislavery equalitarian ideology 
with virtually no antecedent legal history at all. In was these 
phrases, with their expansive implications, which now went into 
the amendment, and not the restrictive phraseology of the Civil 
Rights Act. The Radicals were now amending the Constitution, 
not writing a statute. The debates show that they were well aware 
of the fact. 
This first became evident in February, when Bingham, on the 
instructions of the Joint Committee, introduced the following draft 
of a constitutional amendmenfin the House (H. R. 63): 
"The Congress shall have power to ·make all laws which 
shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens qf each 
State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
States [ Article IV, Section 2]; and to all persons in the several 
States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and prop-
erty [Fifth Amendment] ."85 
Here was the old antislavery theory that the comity clause properly 
constituted a national bill of rights, hitherto without direct federal 
sanctions, which would now be supported with a grant of specific 
congressional legislative power, and that at least the due process 
clause of the federal Bill of Rights should be made a guarantee 
against state action. This was what Bingham meant when he 
85GLOBE 813. This proposal had been evolved after several days of discussion in the 
Joint Committee, which had voted, 9 to 5, to report the amendment to the House. KEN-
DRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITIEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 61 (1914). 
(See note 38 supra.) The proposal had its beginnings in resolutions introduced in the 
House in December by Bingham and Stevens and referred to the Joint Committee. Id. at 
14. The final form of the proposal was Bingham's. 
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said, in explaining his amendment to the House, "Every word of 
the proposed amendment is today in the Constitution of our coun-
try, save the words conferring the express grant of power upon 
the Congress of the United States."86 
Bingham and Stevens presently made it clear that they intended 
the amendment to place all civil rights under a federal guarantee 
of equality against state action, a proposal going far beyond the 
scope of the Civil Rights bill as presently amended. At the same 
time they repelled emphatically the contention that the amendment 
would effect a general transfer of the area of sovereignty over civil 
rights from states to the national government. What they pro-
posed was a congressional guarantee of equality with respect to 
all state legislation, subject only to reasonable classification; sub-
ject to this guarantee, the states' right to legislate was to remain 
unimpaired. 
These points became clear when the amendment came up for 
debate at the end of February. Representative Robert S. Hale of 
New York, a respected Republican and competent lawyer, made 
a carefully considered attack upon the proposal, insisting at some 
length that its language was such that it would effect a total trans-
fer of sovereignty over civil rights from the states to the federal 
government. Thaddeus Stevens challenged this sharply at once, 
insisting that the amendment would merely impose a very general 
and inclusive guarantee of equality upon the states. In support 
of his contention he drew an illustration of "reasonable classifica-
tion" in state legislation to show how the states would retain juris-
diction subject to the federal guarantees.87 
The following day Bingham also undertook to answer Hale. 
Denying that the amendment would invade the powers of the states 
other than with respect to the guarantee of equality, he insisted 
that it was "a proposition to arm the Congress . . . to enforce 
the bill of rights, as it stands in the Constitution . . . [and] no 
more."88 Hale then asked Bingham "as an able constitutional 
lawyer" whether in his opinion the amendment did not secure 
to Congress a "general power of legislation" to protect civil rights. 
Bingham immediately admitted, "I believe it does with respect to 
86 GLOBE 1063-1064. 
87 Ibid. Stevens' argument was a direct anticipation of the "reasonable classification" 
doctrines developed later under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
88 Id. at 1088. The speech makes it clear that by "bill of rights" Bingham meant both 
the guarantees of the comity clause and the guarantees of due process in the Fifth Amend-
ment. · 
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life, liberty, and property as I have heretofore stated it." Not 
satisfied, Hale put again the question of whether the amendment 
would confer "general powers of legislation upon Congress." 
Bingham replied: "It certainly does this: it confers upon Con-
gress the power to see to it that the protection given by the laws 
of the States shall be equal in respect to life and liberty and prop-
erty to all persons." And when Hale asked where this "doctrine" 
was to be found in the amendment, Bingham replied, "The words 
'equal protection' contain it, and nothing else."89 In other words, 
the amendment was to impose a very general requirement of 
equality on all state legislation of the most inclusive kind; at the 
same time it would not affect the capacity of the states to legislate 
otherwise.90 
It will be recalled that early in March, a few days after this 
exchange with Hale, Bingham was to rise in the House to attack 
the constitutionality of the "no discrimination" clause of the Civil 
Rights bill, explaining emphatically that the term "civil rights" 
properly included the entire range of natural, organic, and social 
rights in organized society, that a federal guarantee of such rights 
was altogether laudable but beyond the powers of Congress, and 
that it ought properly to be sought by constitutional amendment. 
This speech properly should be read together with Bingham's 
defense of R.R. 63 as a revelation of his fundamental intentions. It 
le~ves little doubt that his objective was to place all civil rights 
under federal guarantee, but he believed strongly that this must 
be accomplished by constitutional amendment. 
Bingham's amendment was not acted upon; instead the House 
by a vote of llO to 37 postponed further consideration until early 
April.91 In this form the proposal was not heard from again. It 
is sometimes assumed that the shelving of R.R. 63 meant that the 
House had rejected the idea of congressional power to legislate in 
support of a federal guarantee of equality. This conclusion, the 
89 Id. at 1094. 
90 Rogers' main complaint was that Bingham's amendment, if adopted, would destroy 
all state caste legislation entirely, including miscegenation acts, laws imposing special pun-
ishments for crime, and school segregation laws. The latter point he emphasized par-
ticularly, as follows: "In the state of Pennsylvania there are laws which make a distinction 
with regard to the schooling of white children and the schooling of black children. It is 
provided "that certain schools shall be designated and set apart for white children, and 
certain other schools designated and set apart for black children. Under this amendment, 
Congress would have. the power to compel the State to provide for white children and 
black children to attend the same school, upon the principle that all the people in the 
several States shall have equal protection in all the rights of life, liberty, and property, 
and all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." GLOBE, appendix, 134. 
91 GLOBE 1095. 
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present writer believes, is incorrect. The members of the House 
may well have concluded that Hale's argument-that the amend-
ment would result in a general transfer of sovereign~y over all civil 
rights from the states to the federal government-was correct, al-
though Bingliam and Stevens had emphatically denied any such 
purpose. However, this must not be confused with a rejection by 
the House of the fundamental idea of congressional power to im-
pose a guarantee of equality. On the contrary, several Radicals, 
Gilbert Hotchkiss and Roscoe Conkling of New York among them, 
expressed a very different objection to Bingham's amendment: it 
did not, Hotchkiss pointed out, resulf in "permanently securing 
those rights," but left them at the mercy of future congressional 
discretion.92 The answer might be, Conkling suggested, a categori-
cal guarantee of equality which Congress could implement but not 
impair.93 In fact, this was to be the solution embodied in the 
amendment reported out in late April, when once more, however, 
the Radicals were to lay heavy emphasis in debate upon congres-
sional legislative power. 
For about six weeks after the shelving of Bingham's amend-
ment, the.Joint Committee appears to have been inactive. How-
ever, on April 21, Stevens introduced to the committee a proposed 
comprehensive amendment which contained a first section similar 
to the "no discrimination" clause early struck out of the Civil 
Rights Act as far too comprehensive for congressional power. In 
other words, Stevens here sought to incorporate legal language 
which it had already been generally agreed would have the effect 
of destroying all class and caste legislation, including segregation 
laws, a fairly decisive indication that Steven's notions as to the 
comprehensive force that any amendment ought to have were in 
the same class as Bingham's. Significantly, the "no discrimination" 
guarantee in Steven's proposal was now mandatory, and not sub-
ject to congressional discretion, although a separate section (5) 
now gave Congress comprehensive power to enforce the guaran-
tees of the amendment.94 
92 Id. at 1094-1095. 
93 Id. at 1096. Bick.el, in "The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision," 
69 HARv. L. REv. I at.37-40 (1955), thinks Hale's argument prevailed with the House, while 
Fairman, in "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?" 2 STAN. L. 
REv. 5 at 24ff. (1949), thinks Bingham was unable to defend clearly the possible legal im-
plications of the amendment. Both propositions may well be true, although there is no 
specific evidence available at all as to why the House failed to act later. 
94 Section 5, which the committee obviously regarded as of great importance, read as 
follows: "Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions 
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After some uncertainty, the Joint Committee a week later re-
placed Steven's proposal with a new first section drafted al}d intro-
duced by Bingham, modelled upon Bingham's February amend-
ment, but incorporating certain critical changes: 
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son the equal protection of the laws."95 
The new proposal incorporated essentially the same guarantees 
as the February amendment-"privileges and immunities," "due 
process," and "equal protection," but in certain technical respects 
it differed vitally. Most important, it created rights which would 
· be enforceable at law through the judicial process. The rights in 
question would be beyond the power of Congress to impair or de-
stroy by withholding legislative action, as would have been the 
case with the February proposal. . 
More difficult of analysis is the contrast between the two pro-
visions with respect to the capacity of Congress to legislate in the 
area of civil rights generally. The language of the new section 
made it clear that there was to be no transfer of plenary legislative 
. sovereignty over civil rights to Congress but only a congressional 
of this article." KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON R.EcoN-
STRUCfION 83-84 (1914). 
Section one of the proposed amendment provided: "No discrimination shall be made 
by any state, nor by the United States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude." Ibid. Section 2 would have forbidden racial discrimi-
nation in political rights after July 4, 1876; section 3 would have excluded from the basis 
of state representation persons denied the suffrage ·because of race before July 4, 1876; 
section 4 invalidated the Confederate debts. Sections 2, 3, and 4 were subjected to exten-
sive changes before and after the amendment reached the floor. Section 5 alone remained 
unchanged as the amendment was finally adopted. 
95This new first section, which with_ the addition of the citizenship clause was to win 
adoption as the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, was the result of several com-
plex changes in the Joint Committee which revealed great uncertainty on the members' 
part as to precisely how it wished to accomplish its purpose. On April 21, Bingham· first 
moved to add to Stevens' original section I the words: "Nor shall any state deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, nor take private property 
for public use without just compensation." The committee voted this down 6 to 5, with 
only Johnson, Stevens, Bingham, Blow and Rogers supporting it. A few moments later, 
however, Bingham introduced as a proposed new section 5, the provision guaranteeing 
privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection, as set forth in the text above. 
The committee first voted 10 to 2 to accept this proposal; however, four days later the 
members, on Williams' motion, struck the section out, 7 to 5, and a proposal by Bingham 
to submit the deleted section to Congress as a separate amendment also failed, 8 to 4. 
But on April 28, Bingham moved to strike out section I (Stevens' "no discrimination" pro-
vision), and to substitute Bingham's section in its place, and the Committee finally did so, 
10 to 3. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT CoMMITI'EE OF FIFrEEN ON R.EcoNSTRUCfION 
82-107 (1914). · 
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power to enforce the guarantees in the amendment. This met 
successfully the principal change which Hale and others had raised 
in February against H.R. 63. However, this did not mean, as 
was later asserted, that Congress was to be without power to en-
force the guarantees in section one by appropriate legislation. 
Both the journal of the Joint Committee and the debates make it 
clear that section one was to be read in connection with section 
five, so that Congress would have the power to enforce its provi-
sions by appropriate legislation. 
Here still another possible legal distinction appears. The 
February proposal would have given Congress the power in so many 
words to enforce the rights of citizens; section one of the later 
amendment created rights only as against state action. Did this 
mean that the committee now recognized that Congress would not 
be able to legislate to enforce equality as against individual in- · 
fringement, as it later attempted to do in the Civil Rights Act of 
1875? No certain answer is probable; the distinction simply was 
not drawn clearly in committee or debate at the time. All that 
remains certain is that Bingham and the committee did not in-
tend to withdraw congressional power to enforce the rights guaran-
teed in the amendment; instead it merely sought to withdraw from 
legislative discretion any power to impair or diminish the rights 
in question, a change Hotchkiss, Conkling, and other Radicals had 
insisted upon as important. 
When the new amendment reached the floor of Congress on 
April 30,96 a curious ambiguity developed in the Radicals' advocacy 
of the measure. On one hand, the Radical leaders, especially in 
the House, presented the first section as primarily an attempt to 
constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act and so either to remove 
doubts as to its validity or to place the guarantees of the act beyond 
the assault of future hostile Congresses. At the same time, how-
ever, they met the Conservative charges as to the broad and revolu-
tionary scope of the rights to be placed under federal protection 
neither with affirmation nor denial; instead, Bingham, Stevens, 
and their associates used the technique of lofty, expansive, and 
highly generalized language to describe the amendment's potential 
consequences. It was as though the Radical leaders were avoiding 
a precise delineation of legal consequences. 
96 GLOBE 2286. As reported, section I was exactly as Bingham had introduced it to 
the Joint Committee. The citizenship clause presently to become the first sentence of sec-
tion I was added later in the Senate, principally because of doubts about the constitu-
tionality of the guarantee in the Civil Rights Act. GLOBE 2869. 
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This ambiguity was present in Stevens' speech of May 8 open-
ing debate on the amendment in the House. He first reiterated 
the old antislavery theory that these guarantees were already in the 
Declaration of Independence or the "organic law." "But the 
Constitution," he went on, "limits only the action of Congress, 
and is not a limitation on the States. This amendment supplies 
that defect, and allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation 
of the States, so far that the law which operates upon one man 
shall operate equally upon all. . . . Whatever law protects the 
white man shall afford 'equal' protection to the black man."97 
It is worth observing here that Stevens is assuming a comprehen-
sive congressional legislative power to enforce the amendment 
against state law. 
Stevens then went on to avow that a principal purpose of the 
amendment was to place the remedies of the Civil Rights Act 
beyond assault by future unfriendly Congresses: 
"Some answer, 'Your Civil Rights Bill secures the same 
things.' That is partly true, but a law is repealable by a 
majority. And I need hardly say that the first time that the 
South with their copperhead allies obtain the command of 
Congress it will be repealed. . . . This amendment once 
adopted cannot be amended without two-thirds of Congress. 
That they will hardly get."98 
Subsequent speakers on both sides of the House fell in line with 
this theory that the first section was in part at least declaratory 
of the Civil Rights Act, and was intended either to remove doubts 
as to the constitutionality of the law or to place its guarantees 
beyond congressional discretion. Thus Democrat William Finck 
of Ohio twitted the Radicals with the observation that "all I have 
to say about this section is, that if it is necessary to adopt it . . . 
then the civil rights bill, which the President vetoed, was passed 
without authority, and is clearly unconstitutional."99 The re-
sponse of James A. Garfield of Ohio was characteristic of the 
Radical position: "The civil rights bill is now a part of the law 
of this land. But every gentleman knows it will cease to be a part 
of the law whenever the sad moment arrives when that gentleman's 
97 GLOBE 2459. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Id. at 2461. Rep. Charles Eldridge of Wisconsin asked ironically, "What necessity 
is there, then, for this amendment ••• if that bill was constitutional at the time of pas-
sage?" Id. at 2506. 
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party comes into power .... For this reason, and not because I 
believe the civil rights bill unconstitutional, I am glad to see that 
first section here."100 And Henry J. Raymond of New York, 
pointing out that he had voted against the Civil Rights Act because 
of very grave doubts as to its constitutionality, assured the House 
that he had at all times been "heartily in favor" of the law's objec-
tive of "securing an equality of rights for all citizens of the United 
States;" accordingly, he said, he would "vote·very cheerfully" for 
the present section.101 
All this might well imply that the first section of the proposed 
amendment was intended to be merely declaratory of the Civil 
Rights Act, and would not go beyond its rather restrictive guaran-
tees. But a second theme was present in the House debates-the 
argument that the phraseology of the first section was expansive 
and "revolutionary" in character, so that its precise future meaning 
was susceptible to indefinitely broad interpretation. Benjamin 
Boyer of Pennsylvania, speaking for the Democrats, warned that 
section one ". . . is objectionable also in its phraseology, being 
open to ambiguity and admitting of conflicting constructions."102 
Democrat Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania went farther, and 
asserted, "The first section proposes to make an equality in every 
respect between the two races, notwithstanding the policy of dis-
crimination which has hitherto been exclusively exercised by the 
States .... "103 Rogers of New Jersey, now a "bete noire" of the 
Radicals, charged that the term "privileges and immunities" was 
so comprehensive as to work a general revolution in the consti-
tutional system: 
"What are privileges and immunities? Why, sir, all the 
rights we have under the laws of the country are embraced 
under the definition of privileges and immunities. The right 
to vote is a privilege. The right to marry is a privilege. The 
right to contract is a privilege. The right to be a juror is a 
privilege. The right to be a judge or President of the United 
States is a privilege. I hold if that ever becomes a part of the 
fundamental law of the land it will prevent any State from 
refusing to allow anything to anybody embraced under this 
term of privileges and immunities. If a negro is refused the 
right to be a juror, that will take away from his privileges and 
100 Id. at 2462. 
101 Id. at 2502. 
102 Id. at 2461. 
103 Id. at 2530. 
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immunities as a citizen of the United States, and the Federal 
Government will step in and interfere. . ·. . It will result 
in a revolution worse than that through which we have just 
passed."104 
It will be observed that Rogers was adopting precisely the theory 
of "privileges and immunities" which Bingham had presented to 
the House two months earlier. Obviously, also, it was not possible 
for the Radicals to reply with any narrow construction doctrine, 
unless they wished to destroy the expansive force of the first sec-
tion. The only possible reassurance to moderates, therefore, was 
the old antislavery argument that the guarantees in question were 
already in the Constitution, although hitherto without federal 
sanctions against the states, a position which if one recalls expan-
sive doctrine of the Corfield case could hardly have reassured op-
ponents of the amendment very greatly. It was in this vein that 
Bingham undertook a reply to Rogers: 
"The necessity for the first section of this amendment to 
the Constitution, Mr. Speaker, is one of the lessons that have 
been taught to your committee and taught to all the people 
of this country by the history of the past four years of terrible 
conflict-that history in which God is, and in which He 
teaches the profoundest lessons to men and nations. There 
was a want hitherto, and there remains a want now, in the 
Constitution of our country, which the proposed amendment 
will supply. What is that? It is the power in the people, 
the whole people of the United States, by express authority of 
the Constitution, to do that by congressional enactment which 
hitherto they have not had the power to do, and have never 
even attempted to do; that is, to protect by national law the 
privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic 
and the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction 
whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the un-
constitutional acts of any State. 
"Allow me, Mr. Speaker, in passing, to say that this amend-
ment takes from no State any right that ever pertained to it. 
No State ever had the right, under the forms of law or other-
wise, to deny to any freeman the equal protection of the laws · 
or to abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of 
the Republic, although many of them have assumed and 
exercised the power, and that without remedy. . .. "105 
104 Id. at 2538. 
105 Id. at 2542. A few minutes after Bingham spoke the House passed the amend-
ment, 128 to 37. Id. at 2545. 
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On May I 0th, Senator Howard of Michigan, acting as co-chair-
man of the Joint Committee in Fessenden's absence, presented 
the proposed amendment to the upper house. Howard's speech, 
unlike Stevens', presented in no uncertain terms a powerful and 
convincing "broad construction" of the force and scope of the 
first section. Taking up the privileges and immunities clause, 
he first asserted that any attempt at a precise delineation of rights 
under the clause would be "a somewhat barren discussion" princi-
pally because the provision in Article IV of the old Constitution 
had never been subjected to analysis by the Supreme Court. How-
ever, he next cited Justice Washington's enumeration in the 
Corfield case and asserted that all these rights would now fall under 
federal protection. "To these," he said, "should be ad9-ed the 
personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amend-
ments to the Constitution."106 The rights in question, he said, 
were all in the present Constitution, but there was no means of 
enforcing them against the states. "The great object of the first 
section of this amendment," he said, "is, therefore, to restrain the 
power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these 
great fundamental guarantees." This would be achieved, he said, 
through congressional action under section five, which was "a 
direct affirmative delegation of power . . . to carry out all the 
principles of all these guarantees .... "107 
Howard then presented an extremely latitudinarian interpreta-
tion of the due process clause, which he asserted would destroy 
all state class legislation entirely: 
"The last two clauses of the first section of the amend-
·ment disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the 
United States, but any person, whoever he may be, of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law. . . . This 
abolishes all class legislati~n in the States, and does away with 
106 Id. at 2765. It is worth observing that Howard, at least, assumed that the new 
amendment would embody the first eight amendments as a guarantee against the states. 
Five years later, in a lengthy speech in the House, Bingham claimed that in drafting sec-
tion I of the amendment he had followed a suggestion of John Marshall in Barron v. 
Baltimore, and had sought deliberately to incorporate the guarantees of the first eight 
amendments. "These eight articles ••• " he said, "were never limitations upon the power 
of the States until made so by the fourteenth amendment." CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st 
sess., appendix, 84ff (1871). FLACK, THE AnoPTION OF nm FOURTEENUI AMENDMENT, 
(1908), asserted long ago that the Joint Committee intended to incorporate the Bill of 
Rights in the new amendment. Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate 
the Bill of Rights?" 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949), however, argues the opposite conclusion, in 
the opinion of this writer against the weight of the evidence. 
107 GLOBE 2766. 
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the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not 
applicable to another. It prohibits the hanging of a black man 
for a crime for which the white man is not hanged. It pro-
tects the black man in his fundamental rights as a citizen with 
the same shield which it throws over the white man. . . . I 
look upon the first section, taken in connection with the fifth, 
as very important. It will, if adopted by the States, forever 
disable everyone of them from passing laws trenching on those 
fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to citizens of 
the United States, and to all persons who may happen to be 
within their jurisdiction. It establishes equality before the 
law, and it gives to the humblest, the poorest, the most despised 
of the race the same rights and same protection before the law 
as it gives to the most powerful, the most wealthy, or the most 
haughty. That, sir, is republican government as I understand 
it, and the only one which can claim the praise of a just 
Government."108 
In the debates which followed, there was a general assumption 
of the accuracy of Howard's latitudinarian interpretation. This 
meant in turn that there was less disposition in the Senate than 
there had been in the House to reassure the moderates that the 
first section of the amendment involved nothing more than a 
constitutionalization of the Civil Rights Act. In one significant 
exchange, indeed, with Senator Doolittle of Wisconsin, Fessenden, 
as co-chairman of the Joint Committee, undertook to deny cate-
gorically that the first section had been inspired by the Civil Rights 
Act or indeed had anything to do with it at all. Its contents, he 
pointed out, were entirely different, and it made "no reference" to 
the disputed law.109 However, Howard broke in to concede 
10s Ibid. 
109 Id. at 2896. Senator Doolittle of Wisconsin had charged that the first section, 
which he said obviously had its origins in the Bingham amendment of February, had been 
inspired directly by Bingham's own doubts about the constitutionality of the civil rights 
bill, as expressed in debate in. the House. Fessenden retorted indignantly that there was 
"not a particle, not a scintilla of truth" in this assertion. H. R. 63, he pointed out, had 
originated in the Joint Committee and had been reported out long before the Civil Rights 
bill came up for debate there. The Joint Committee, he insisted, had never mentioned 
the Civil Rights bill, either in drafting H. R. 63, or in its consideration of the present 
section. When Doolittle conceded that he thought the section• had been brought forward 
because the committee had "doubts as to the constitutional power of Congress to pass the 
civil rights bill," Fessenden replied that "if they had doubts, no such doubts were stated 
in the committee of fifteen, and the matter was not put on that grounds at all. There was 
no question raised about the civil rights bill." And when Doolittle then asked, "if there 
are no doubts, why amend the Constitution on that subject?" Fessenden replied sharply, 
"That question the Senator may answer to suit himself. It has no reference to the civil 
rights bill." 
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that one purpose of the first section was to place the Civil Rights 
Act beyond possibility of attack by conservatives,110 while Senator 
Poland observed later that the constitutional power of Congress 
to "uproot and destroy all such partial State legislation" as violated 
"the spirit of the Declaration of Independence" had been "doubted 
and denied by persons entitled to high consideration;" hence the 
advisability, he said, of writing section one into the Constitution.111 
As in the House, however, both friends and opponents of the 
amendment spoke in terms of expansive generalizations and 
avoided any specific discussion of the immediate impact of section 
one on state racial caste legislation. Senator Hendricks of Indiana, 
for example, struck a characteristic Conservative note, when he 
charged that the section had such force that under it "Congress 
might invade the jurisdiction of the States, rob them of their 
reserved rights and crown the Federal Government with absolute 
and despotic power."112 Garrett Davis in similar vein asserted that 
the "real purpose" of the section was to make Negroes citizens, 
"to prop the civil rights bill," and to "press ... [Negroes] for-
ward to a full community of civil and political rights with the white 
race."113 Senator Poland, a good Radical, thought on the other 
hand that section one expressed "the very spirit and inspiration of 
our system of government," as set forth in the Declaration of In-
dependence and the Constitution.114 Timothy Howe of Wiscon-
sin, another Radical, was almost the only man who became specific; 
he singled out for especial condemnation as a type of statute the 
section would kill a Florida school segregation law which provided 
a separate and inferior school for Negroes, subjected them to a 
separate school tax, and cut them off from regular state school 
funds.115 Richard Yates of Illinois, on the other hand, adopted an 
outright "declaratory" theory of the first section, insisting that 
the Thirteenth Amendment already made the Negro a citizen 
"entitled to be protected in all his rights and privileges as one of 
the citizens of the United States."116 
The amendment presently passed both houses by large major-
110 GLOBE 2896. 
111 Id. at 2961. 
112 Id. at 2940. 
113 Id., appendix at 240. 
114 Id. at 2961. 
115 Id., appendix at 219. Howe's speech can hardly be read as an attack on school 
segregation as such; rather it was the inferiority of the Negro school systems and the in-
equity of the tax system on which he centered his objections. 
1161d. at !1037. 
1084 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
ities without any resolution of the ambiguous contradiction of the 
Radicals' assurances that they proposed merely to constitutionalize 
the Civil Rights Act and their proposal to "abolish all class legis-
lation" in the United States. It is probable that the Radicals in 
fact had no great desire to resolve that ambiguity, for which there 
was a highly plausible explanation in the politics of the moment. 
The political situation in Congress in the Spring of 1866 was not 
yet entirely clear. President Johnson's influence was rapidly being 
destroyed, but there was a substantial bloc of moderate Repub-
licans who had not yet committed themselves entirely to the Rad-
ical position. Bingham, Stevens, Morrill, Poland, Howard, Howe 
and the other Radicals were dear enough about what they 'Yanted 
to accomplish, but if they drove home too far the proposition on 
the floor that their amendment would undoubtedly consummate 
·the destruction of all caste and class legislation in the states, an 
important element of moderate Republican support might be 
alienated and the requisite two-thirds majority necessary to the 
amendment's adoption might not be obtained. Political strategy 
called for ambiguity, not clarity. 
This position was the easier to assume for the obvious reason 
that the legal phrases incorporated in the amendment could not be 
defined exactly as to their probable future legal force and effect. 
It was "somewhat barren" as Senator Howard remarked, to attempt 
this. This was true because, as observed above, the guarantees in 
question were derived principally from the pre-war antislavery 
movement, their meaning there was vague and expansive, and 
ideological rather than legal; even where the phrases in question 
had been in the courts, the Radicals had given them an expansive 
ideological content in their own thinking. 
So the first section of the amendment had a philosophic and 
expansive character which the Radicals refused to define exactly. 
As Bingham observed significantly early in the session, "You do not 
prohibit murder in the Constitution; you guarantee life in the 
Constitution."117 There were vast advantages in this, for if the 
political and social currents of the nation consummated the revolu-
tionary implications of the amendment they were writing, then 
subsequent judicial and congressional implementation and the 
overall dynamism of consequent constitutional growth would 
achieve their ultimate purposes. These men were hardly impressed 
with the idea of a static constitutional order. The atmosphere, 
117Id. at 432. 
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as Senator Morrill and Representative Rogers both observed at 
one time or another, was "revolutionary." 
The same lack of certainty as to the precise scope of civil rights 
falling under federal protection by nature of the amendment as 
well as its precise effect upon state racial classification legislation 
appeared again and again throughout the remainder of the Recon-
struction era in subsequent congressional attempts to deal with the 
question of civil rights and the Negro. Congressional support for 
segregated Negro schools in the District of Columbia and Sumner's 
long and unavailing fight to abolish segregated Negro schools in the 
District of Columbia has frequently been cited as evidence of con-
gressional intent to apply "narrow construction" to state racial 
laws, although technically the parallel is not constitutionally pre-
cise or apposite.118 On the other hand, the Radicals were partially 
successful in their fight to impose "conditions subsequent" in the 
bills "readmitting" several Southern states, whereby anti-segrega-
tion provisions were guaranteed in the constitutions of the states 
in question_119 Again the willingness of Congress to impose such 
requirements on the South is not altogether apposite as an indica-
tion of its interpretation of the precise force of the amendment on 
the states generally. Perhaps the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875 ultimately is the most decisive indication of the conviction 
of a large majority of the Radicals that Congress might properly 
forbid state caste and segregation legislation under the amendment, 
but again this law implied congressional power and discretion, not 
necessarily the existence of prior mandatory rights enforceable un-
der the amendment alone.120 All this merely proves that the precise 
118 See, for example, Judge Prettyman's opinion in Carr v. Corning, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 
182 F. (2d) 14 at 17, where he argued that congressional support for segregated schools in 
the District of Columbia contemporaneously with the adoption of the amendment was con-
clusive evidence that Congress had not intended section I to invalidate state school segre-
gation laws. 
119 Thus an act to readmit Virginia to representation in Congress imposed on the state 
as a condition-subsequent the stipulation, "That the Constitution of Virginia shall never 
be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States 
of the school rights and privileges secured by the constitution of said State." 16 Stat. L. 
63 (1870). This provision was the result of a long fight in Congress and in Virginia to 
guarantee unsegregated schools in the state. 
120 It is important to realize that it was in an atmosphere of fairly severe reaction from 
the pro-Negro radicalism of 1866 that the "orthodox" interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment developed, in the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Civil Rights Cases, and Plessy v. 
Ferguson. The new orthodoxy won such. complete acceptance in both legal and political 
thinking that it became extremely difficult to recapture an understanding of either the 
spirit or the legal philosophy which. gave birth to the amendment. See WOODWARD, RE-
UNION AND REAcnoN (1951); Graham, "The Fourteenth Amendment and Sch.ool Segrega-
tion," 3 BUFFALO L. REv. I (1953). 
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meaning of the amendment was an extremely fluid state throughout 
the Reconstruction era, as it was in the minds of so many men who 
voted for the amendment in 1866. 
Perhaps the final comment on the entire problem of the amend-
ment's meaning is the observation that the amendment was now a 
part of a living and dynamic constitutional system. Its meaning 
consequently was ultimately to reflect through the medium of the 
judicial process the evolution of democratic aspiration, will and 
myth in the American social order on the question of race and caste. 
The post-Reconstruction Conservative reaction was to create a 
body of constitutional doctrine which constricted the amendment 
into the narrowest possible confines of original intent and came 
near frustrating entirely the old Radical equalitarian and humani-
tarian ideal. In our own time,_ another Radical evolution of social-
political ideology has undoubtedly brought the force and intent of 
the amendment with respect to race and caste far nearer to the old 
antislavery ideal out of which the language of the first section 
grew. There is nothing very surprising in this, for the notion of 
a static constitution is ultimately a :fiction; the Court merely im-
poses a kind of stability and continuity upon the evolution of mass 
myth and social will as translated into constitutional law. Today, 
the meaning of the Constitution represents very nearly the fulfill-
ment of the old Radical dream. The Constitution itself, however, 
has not been outraged; rather we still face the ancient and pro-
found question of what constitutes intelligent race policy in a con-
stitutional democracy. 
